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When choices are made freely, they might emerge from pre-existing neural activity.
However, whether neurons in the prefrontal cortex (PF) show this anticipatory effect
and, if so, in which part of the process they are involved is still debated. To answer this
question, we studied PF activity in monkeys while they performed a strategy task. In
this task when the stimulus changed from the previous trial, the monkeys had to shift
their response to one of two spatial goals, excluding the one that had been previously
selected. Under this free-choice condition, the prestimulus activity of the same neurons
that are involved in decision and motor processes predicted future choices. These
neurons developed the same goal preferences during the prestimulus presentation as
they did later in the decision phase. In contrast, the same effect was not observed in
motor-only neurons and it was present but weaker in decision-only neurons. Overall, our
results suggest that the PF neuronal activity predicts upcoming actions mainly through
the decision-making network that integrate in time decision and motor task aspects.
Keywords: prefrontal, monkeys, decision making, neurophysiology, strategy, bias
INTRODUCTION
Decision-making has been traditionally studied using experimental paradigms in which the correct
choice is determined by a set of instructions. However, little attention has been paid to how
decisions are made when subjects are free to decide when to act or which choice to make. In the
latter situation of free choice, most experiments have focused on cases in which the options that are
provided are neither correct nor incorrect but have different associated values (Thorndike, 1898;
Herrnstein, 1961). Under such conditions, decisions are the result of a noisy, deliberative process
in which the value of each option is compared and assessed (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). But what
determines what we decide when the options have comparable values?
One possible answer might be provided by the neural activity that precedes the decision-making
process (Libet et al., 1983; Haynes et al., 2007; Soon et al., 2008). In a recent neuroimaging
experiment, Soon et al. (2008) demonstrated that from brain activity, it is possible to predict
future decisions long before subjects report that the decision has reached awareness. In
neurophysiological studies with primates, the influence of the previous state of the brain on
future choices has been examined using perceptual discrimination and value-based tasks. For
instance, during perceptual judgment tasks with ambiguous or nearly ambiguous stimuli,
certain neurons in the lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP), medial superior temporal area (MST) and
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superior colliculus (SC; Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Shadlen
and Newsome, 2001; Williams et al., 2003) develop an
anticipatory response that is predictive of future choices, even
before perceptual evidence is available. Although this type of
anticipatory neural activity can help to decide which option to
choose, for certain occasions, it needs to be overcome. Neurons
from the thalamus are involved in this process (Minamimoto
et al., 2014). Other neurophysiological studies have adopted
value-based tasks in which the potential options are drawn
from a well-known set and have different associated values.
Several studies have shown that in these paradigms, decisions
can be predicted even before the two options are presented
from the anticipatory activity of neurons in the frontal eye
field (FEF), supplementary eye field (SEF) and caudate nucleus
(CD; Coe et al., 2002; Lauwereyns et al., 2002; Ding and
Hikosaka, 2006). Although these reports consistently indicate the
presence of anticipatory activity in areas that are predictive of
future choice, there are contrasting results in neurophysiology.
While some previous neurophysiological studies have found
some evidence (Maoz et al., 2013) others have failed to
provide similar evidence for the prefrontal cortex (PF; Kim
and Shadlen, 1999; Katsuki et al., 2014), notwithstanding its
function in goal-encoding (Tanji and Hoshi, 2001; Mushiake
et al., 2006; Genovesio et al., 2008, 2014a,b; Yamagata et al., 2012;
Genovesio and Ferraina, 2014; Falcone et al., 2015; Stoianov
et al., 2016), its activation during free-choice tasks in humans
(Rowe et al., 2005; Thimm et al., 2012) and the possibility of
biasing target selection by electrical stimulation (Opris et al.,
2005). The latter suggests that PF activity during and, likely,
before presentation of a stimulus influences future choices when
the correct choice is not dictated by external instructions or
rules.
In this study, we examined the relationship between the
activity of neurons in the PF before potential choices are
revealed and the choices that are freely made afterward. We
identified the group of neurons that were involved in free-
choice decision-making and during motor selection and then
determined whether the neurons conveyed any prestimulus
activity that might bias future choices. To this end, we used
a previous dataset of a strategy paradigm that included free-
choice trials (Figures 1A,B; Genovesio et al., 2005, 2006). Briefly,
the strategy task required monkeys to use a repeat-stay or and
change-shift strategy. In each trial, three spatial goals were
presented. Based on a comparison between the current instructed
stimulus (IS) and that in the previous trial, the monkeys had
to select the same spatial goal as in the previous trial (repeat-
stay strategy) when the stimulus was repeated or reject the
previous spatial goal and select one of two other goals when
the stimulus changed (change-shift trials). In change-shift trials,
after presentation of the IS, the monkeys faced a decision
between options of comparable value. In each of these trials,
only one goal led to the reward, which was randomly decided
by the computer beforehand. A second-chance trial followed non
rewarded change-shift trials in which the monkeys were required
to choose the location of the alternative goal to be rewarded
(see ‘‘Materials and Methods’’ Section). In this task the monkeys
could not commit to a decision before the stimulus appearance
because one third of the trials, when the strategy to apply was
the repeat-stay trial, were forced choice trials. We considered
the change-shift trials as a free-choice condition, because the
decision was never dictated by any external instruction or rule
as in value-based studies and primarily because, in contrast to
previous studies (Barraclough et al., 2004; Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad, 2006; Kennerley et al., 2009), the two alternatives could
never be compared, based on any perceptual or value-based
metric. Thus, the degree of freedom in the decision-making
process was maximized.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Behavioral Task
Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; 7.7 and 8.8 Kg)
performed a strategy task (Figures 1A,B). All procedures were
in accordance with the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory
Animals (1996, ISBN 0-309-05377-3) and were approved by
the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Animal Care
and Use Committee (IACUC). Details on the experimental
procedures have been described in Genovesio et al. (2005, 2006).
In brief, the oculomotor task consisted of two types of trials:
repeat-stay and change-shift. Each trial started with a central
stimulus (0.7◦ white circle) appearing at the center of a screen.
Once the monkey fixated on the central spot, three potential goal
locations appeared (2.2◦ unfilled white squares), 14◦ up, left and
right from the central stimulus. Each stimulus comprised two
superimposed ASCII characters, usually in different colors. The
monkeys were required to fixate on the central stimulus (±7.5◦)
for 1 s. Then, the central stimulus was replaced by a visual IS that
was presented for 1.0, 1.5, or 2.0 s (pseudorandomly selected).
After the IS disappeared, the monkey was required to make a
saccade toward one of the three spatial goals within 2 s and
maintain its fixation (±6.7◦) for 1.0 s. An intertrial time of 2.5 s
separated the end of a trial from the beginning of the next one.
The sequence of the task events is illustrated in Figure 1A.
The correct choice depend on the strategy that was required,
which was to select the same spatial goal as in the previous
trial when the IS was the same as in the previous trial
(repeat-stay trial) or to choose one of the other two goal
locations (change-shift trial or free-choice trial) when the
stimulus changed (Figure 1B). Because each stimulus was
selected pseudorandomly from a set of three stimuli, 67% of
trials were free-choice trials and 33% of them were repeat-stay
trials. After a correct strategy response, repeat-stay trials were
always rewarded, whereas free-choice trials were rewarded in
50% of cases.Maintaining this reward rate in the free-choice trials
precluded the possibility to develop any consistent relationship
between stimuli and choices (see Figure 1D in Genovesio et al.,
2005).
Unrewarded trials were followed by a second-chance trial,
keeping the distribution of the reward rates of each goal
comparable and independent of any preference by the monkeys.
In the second-chance trial, the monkeys were required to select
the goal that remained after eliminating the most recent ones. In
all cases, the reward consisted of a 0.1-ml drop of fluid.
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental task and recording locations. (A) Temporal sequence of task events. White dot represents the fixation spot, white squares indicate the
target location (not to scale), and “A” represents the stimulus (2 superimposed ASCII characters were presented instead). The empty target squares became white
after the monkeys selected one of them. The disappearance of the stimulus instructed the monkeys to report their decision with a saccade movement toward one
target. After maintaining target fixation for 1.0 s during the target hold period and 0.5 s during the pre-reward period, the reward was delivered when appropriate.
Abbreviations: IS1, early instruction stimulus; IS2 late instruction stimulus; RMT, reaction movement time. (B) Strategy task. (1) Repeat-stay trials and (2) change-shift
trials, also designed as free-choice trials, because the monkeys could freely choose one of two potential targets (left and top goals in the example). The trials in
(B) are considered example trials following the trial represented in (A), in which the instruction stimulus (IS) was the red “A” and the goal chosen was on the right. The
monkeys were required to evaluate whether the IS was repeated from the previous trial: when it was repeated, the monkeys’ task was to choose the same goal as
that selected in the previous trial (repeat-stay trials) or shift goals when the stimulus changed (change-shift trials). Repeat-stay trials were always rewarded, whereas
shift trials were rewarded half of the time. Second-chance trials followed unrewarded change-shift trials. In these trials, the monkeys had a second chance to respond
and be rewarded by choosing the goal selected least recently (left in the example). (C) Recordings sites. Abbreviations: AS, arcuate sulcus; PS, principal sulcus.
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Surgery
In an aseptic surgical procedure and using isoflurane anesthesia
(1 to 3%), we performed a 27 × 36-mm craniotomy over the
right frontal lobe in each monkey. Then, we implanted several
titanium bone screws into the surrounding bone, to which we
attached a recording chamber and a head-restraint device with
methacrylate acrylic cement. Postoperative analgesia was given
for 3–5 days.
Data Collection Methods
The monkeys’ eye position recorded and monitored with an
infrared oculometer (Bouis Instruments, Karlsruhe, Germany) at
500 or 1000 Hz. Single-unit potentials were isolated with quartz-
insulated platinum-iridium electrodes (impedance, 0.5–1.5 M
at 1 kHz), advanced into the cortex by a 16-electrode
microdrive with independent control of each electrode (Thomas
Recording, Giessen, Germany). The signal was amplified
and discriminated using a multispike detector (Alpha-Omega
Engineering, Nazareth, Israel) or a multichannel acquisition
processor (Plexon, Dallas, TX, USA). With the latter, neuronal
waveforms were always resorted with the Offline Sorter (Plexon).
We used CORTEX1 to control behavior and collect data.
Figure 1C shows the recorded locations in the dorsolateral
PF (PFdl) and dorsomedial PF (PFdm; spanning areas 6, 8,
and 9).
Data Analysis
Neural Analyses
From the initial dataset on 1456 neurons in the PF (Genovesio
et al., 2005), we selected neurons that had a mean activity of
at least 1 spike/s within 200–800 ms from presentation of the
stimulus (n = 887/1456). In this subset, we identified decision
neurons and motor neurons. The decision neurons were defined
as the neurons that were spatial goal-selective (top, left, right)
in the IS1 (early instruction stimulus period) period of the
free-choice trials (n = 143/887, recorded from 93 experimental
sessions; one-way ANOVA, p < 0.05). The motor neurons were
defined as the neurons encoding the goal location in the reaction
and movement time (RMT; n = 145/887; one-way ANOVA,
p < 0.05). Bias activity was studied in the period between 0 and
200 ms before stimulus presentation (prestimulus period). We
used this temporal window, because it is the period just before
the presentation of the stimulus. In all cases, only correct trials
were considered for analyses.
The average firing rate of the neural population was plotted
using the mean of the individual neural responses, calculated
with a window of 50 ms and a sliding window of 5 ms to smooth
the curves. The statistical significance (paired t-test) between
preferred and nonpreferred goals conditions was calculated using
a nonoverlapping window of 100 ms. Only the time intervals in
which the neural activity was significantly different for at least
three bins are reported. Different windows sizes led to equivalent
results (data not shown). The preferred and nonpreferred goals
for each neuron corresponded to the goal that was associated
1http://dally.nimh.nih.gov
with the maximum average activity and the average of the two
remaining ones, respectively.
Behavioral Prediction
To determine the percentage of choices that could be predicted by
the neural activity in the prestimulus period, we implemented a
classification procedure with neuron-dropping analysis (Foffani
and Moxon, 2004; Lebedev et al., 2004) using neural activity as
the predictor variable. We sorted the free-choice trials by neuron
and selected goal and calculated the mean firing rate in each trial
in the periods of interest. Thus, each neuron had a distribution
of mean firing rates for the left, top and right choices in free-
choice trials. To classify a trial, we randomly took a trial from
each neuron (test trial), and for each selected goal, we calculated a
look-up table, consisting of the mean firing rates of all remaining
trials (neural response templates). Then, the Euclidean distance
between the test trial and templates was used as a criterion to
estimate the choice. The trial was classified as belonging to a
specific goal location, based on the smallest sum of calculated
distances. The neuron-dropping analysis comprised randomly
eliminating one neuron in each iteration; thus, the estimate first
considers all neurons from a group and the number of neurons
decreases until one remains. This procedure was repeated 1000
times to estimate the probability of correctly predicting the future
choice for each specific subset of neurons. Increasing the number
of iterations did not significantly influence the results (data not
shown).
Histological Analysis
Toward the end of the data collection, we created electrolytic
lesions (15 A for 10 s, anodal current) in locations at two depths
per penetration. After approximately 10 days, the animal was
deeply anesthetized and perfused with formaldehyde-containing
fixative. The brains were later sectioned in the coronal plane
and Nissl-stained for cytoarchitectonic analysis (Genovesio et al.,
2005). We plotted the surface projections of the recording sites
by reference to the recovered electrolytic lesions and the marking
pins that were inserted during the perfusion.
RESULTS
Neural Response Bias
Overall, the monkeys performed well on the task—Monkeys 1
and 2 had a correct response rate of 96% and 83% in the change-
shift trials, respectively, compared with 92% and 88% during
the repeat-stay trials. The RMT during free-choice trials was
442.7± 7.6 ms for Monkey 1 and 441.4± 8.1 ms for Monkey 2.
To determine whether neurons modulated their activity
before the stimulus was presented, we focused our analyses on
the change-shift trials and on three kinds of neurons: those
that were involved in the decision process but not in motor
selection (decision-only neurons), those that were involved
during motor selection but not during decision making (motor-
only neurons) and those that were involved in both decision
making and motor selection (decision and motor neurons).
Henceforth, the change-shift trials are referred to as free-
choice trials, because in these cases, the monkeys were free to
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choose between two goals without knowing which goal would
be rewarded. The decision neurons were defined as those that
encoded the future goal location in the first 80–400 ms of the
IS (IS1; prestimulus period) whereas the motor neurons are
those that encoded it during the RMT period. The prestimulus
period corresponded to the time during which the monkeys
were first informed on the two potential goals during the
free-choice trials. To identify both group of neurons, we
performed a one-way ANOVA (p < 0.05) with future goal
location (top, right, left) as a factor. We identified 143 of
887 (16%) neurons modulated by goal location during the
prestimulus period and 145 neurons (16%) modulated during
the RMT period with 42 neurons belonging to the two groups
(Figure 2A).
Next, we examined whether the population of decision-
only neurons showed a prestimulus neural response bias by
comparing their activity for choices toward the preferred and
nonpreferred goal locations before presentation of the IS. Top
panel of Figure 2B shows that the decision-only neurons that
were selective for a specific goal location were goal-selective
during IS1, as expected. Interestingly, the neurons developed
significant differences in the activity between preferred and
nonpreferred future goals before presentation of the IS,
indicating the presence of a neural response bias. The activity
that was associated with the preferred and nonpreferred goal
locations began to differ significantly approximately 200 ms
(paired t-test, p < 0.01) before presentation of the stimulus.
The activity of these neurons was also significant for 400 ms
after the disappearance of the IS (from 200 to 600 ms after
IS offset). On the contrary, the activity between preferred and
nonpreferred goals of motor-only neurons was significantly
different 200ms after the appearance of IS but not before (middle
panel, Figure 2B). Moreover, the difference between conditions
persisted during the entire RMT period. The difference between
preferred and nonpreferred conditions of the decision andmotor
neurons is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2B. The
activity between conditions started to significantly differ 900 ms
before the IS presentation and remained significant during the
entire IS and RMT periods. Figure 2C shows a histogram with
the difference between preferred and nonpreferred conditions
for each neural group during the prestimulus period. The
difference is significant for decision-only and decision and
motor neurons but not for motor-only neurons. Moreover, this
result held when we selected the half of decision and motor
neurons with the lowest maximum selectivity in the IS1 period
(paired t-test, p < 0.05). Thus, we can rule out the possibility
that the differences in the prestimulus activity between the
groups could be accounted by differences in the degree of
selectivity.
An example of a decision and motor neuron that was selective
for the left goal in the free-choice trials is shown in Figure 3.
This neuron had higher activity in the decision period (left
panel, Figure 3) for the left goal (preferred) than for the top
and right goals (nonpreferred goals). Further, it developed a
response bias for the future goal choice in the prestimulus
period, anticipating the same preference for the left goal, showed
during the decision period. Thus, this preference appeared, even
before the stimulus was presented and, therefore, before the two
alternative goals could be identified. The same preference for
the left goal was maintained later by this neuron in the RMT
period, declining only after acquisition of the goal (right panel,
Figure 3).
Neural Selectivity and Prediction
To quantify how reliably the prestimulus activity of each
group of neurons predicted the final goal choice, we used a
classification algorithm with neuron-dropping analysis (Laubach
et al., 2000; Foffani and Moxon, 2004; see ‘‘Materials and
Methods’’ Section). Figure 4 shows the probability of correctly
predicting a monkey’s future goal choice as a function of
the number of neurons that were used for prediction (from
n = 1 to n = 101 for decision-only neurons; from n = 1
to n = 103 for motor-only neurons; from n = 1 to n = 42
for decision and motor neurons). The prediction exceeded
chance values (33%) for decision-only and decision and motor
neurons, increasing in both cases with the number of neurons
that were used together. Chance value was 33% because in
the prestimulus period, before IS presentation, all three targets
were potential goals. On the contrary, the prediction remained
at chance level for the motor-only neurons, independently of
the number of neurons used for prediction. Importantly, the
decision and motor neurons showed a much greater proportion
of correctly predicted trials compared with the decision-only
neurons. Moreover, the prediction from the prestimulus activity
of decision and motor neurons peaked at ∼55%, well above
chance and close to the maximum percentage of trials that could
be predicted (66%) considering that before the presentation of
the stimulus the potential choices were three. These results show
a high predictive power of the future choice of the prestimulus
activity of decision and motor neurons. Moreover, the prediction
is notably higher than that provided by the decision-only
neurons.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we have provided evidence that pre-exiting activity
of some neurons in the PF biases monkeys’ future choices.
In particular, we have shown that the prestimulus activity of
the decision and motor neurons had a high predictive power
during free-choice trials reaching a value of 55% (chance
value is 33%) when all neurons of the group were pooled.
We differentiated motor and decision activity based on the
period of the analysis, notwithstanding the fact that other
functions, such as attention to target and motor vs. abstract
goal coding, could not be dissociated. Our central finding is
that a preference for the same target emerged in these neurons
before presentation of the stimulus, indicating that the same
future choice is encoded already in the pre-existing activity.
Moreover, the neural activity bias emerged 900 ms, but not
earlier, before presentation of the stimulus, suggesting that
the neural response bias originated only after the beginning
of the trial, when the monkeys were engaged in the new
trial. However, they did not yet commit to any decision as
shown by the good performance in the repeat-stay trials that
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FIGURE 2 | Neural classification and population activities in free-choice trials. (A) Number of neurons classified as decision-only, motor-only or decision and
motor neurons (not to scale). (B) Mean firing rate of each neural population during free-trials. Population activity of decision-only neurons (n = 101; Top panel),
motor-only neurons (n = 103; Middle panel) and decision and motor neurons (n = 42; Bottom panel) divided by preferred (dark colors) and nonpreferred goal
locations (light colors) of the neurons aligned to the stimulus presentation (left) and offset (right). The squares indicate the prestimulus period (from 200 to 0 ms before
stimulus onset; in all panels, paired t-test, ∗p < 0.01). Shaded areas indicate SEM. (C) Distribution of the individual difference in firing rate between preferred and
nonpreferred goal locations during the prestimulus period (indicated by the squares in B) for the three group of neurons (pared t-test, ∗p < 0.01). Dot lines indicates
the mean of each distribution.
imposed a forced choice (see Figure 2 in Genovesio et al.,
2005).
To achieve a high level of accuracy in the strategy task
the monkeys needed to perform several cognitive operations
in addition to a free choice. First, they needed to maintain in
memory the previous IS and chosen goal to be able to select the
correct goal in the trial. Second, they needed to decide to either
stay or switch to a different response based on the comparison
between IS in the previous and current trial. Last and only in the
free-choice trials they needed to choose one of two targets. While
the other cognitive operations were examined by our previous
articles (Genovesio et al., 2005, 2006, 2008) here we focus only on
the free-choice. Free-choice trials incorporated at least two task
features that provided a suitable framework to studymodulations
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FIGURE 3 | Raster plot of an example decision and motor neuron. Trials
are sorted by preferred (black) or nonpreferred (gray) goal choice. The data are
aligned to the stimulus onset (Left panel) and stimulus offset (Right panel).
Arrows on top of the right panel indicate the preferred (black) and
nonpreferred goals (gray). Gray rectangle marks the prestimulus period.
in anticipatory neural responses. One important feature that
differentiates our study from most existing neurophysiological
reports is that the two alternative goal locations in each free-
choice trial were not specified before the stimulus was presented;
thus, the monkeys could never covertly choose a specific goal or
prepare for a specific action. This uncertainty depended on the
task design, which interleaved the free-choice trials with repeat-
stay trials in each block. Hence, any anticipatory activity that
biased the goal choice appeared before the alternative goals were
known. The second hallmark of the free-choice trials was that the
two goals never differed in value in terms of reward probability.
The presence of rewarded second-chance trials after unrewarded
change-shift trials maintained a comparable number of rewards
that were associated with each goal location, independent of the
monkeys’ past choices. By balancing the goal values, the influence
of pre-existing bias activity on the decision process might have
increased and thus become detectable, in contrast with previous
studies. Indeed, it has been proposed that any small bias can
unbalance the competition between population of task selective
neurons (Rolls and Deco, 2011; Marcos et al., 2013). Our task
design and those of other studies share the feature that the neural
response bias is not accounted for by the motivation to anticipate
the delivery of a reward due to a delay between presentation of
the stimulus and the go signal.
Many studies have examined the function of PF in decision-
making, most of which have focused on tasks in which the correct
response depends on the comparison between sensorial events
using disparate sensory systems and domains, demonstrating
how PF cells participate in decision-making (Kim and Shadlen,
1999; Hoshi et al., 2000; Freedman et al., 2001; Brody et al., 2003;
Genovesio et al., 2009, 2011, 2012, 2015; Hussar and Pasternak,
2013; Roy et al., 2014; Marcos et al., 2016). However, few studies
have explored the influence that any pre-existing activity of PF
neurons has on decision-making, and moreover, they seem to
have contradictory results.
FIGURE 4 | Behavioral prediction from the prestimulus neural activity
of each neural group. Proportion of trials in which the goal choice was
predicted from the prestimulus activity of the decision-only neurons (blue),
motor-only neurons (red) and decision and motor neurons (green) when
considering a variable number of neurons (from n = 1 to n = 101, from n = 1
to 103 and from n = 1 to n = 42, respectively). The horizontal dashed line
shows the chance level of the prediction (33%).
Several neurophysiological studies have failed to observe an
anticipatory response bias in PF neurons whenmonkeys perform
perceptual discrimination tasks, even when the psychological
judgments were difficult (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Katsuki
et al., 2014). In Katsuki et al. (2014), for example, monkeys
were required to locate a salient stimulus that was surrounded
by other distractors and release a lever when a subsequent
stimulus was presented at the same location as the salient
stimulus. They found that activity of the parietal area LIP
but not of the PFdl before presentation of the stimulus was
predictive of the monkeys’ future decisions regarding the
presence of the salient stimulus, although only transiently. In a
recent categorization experiment with ambiguous stimuli, Roy
et al. (2014) identified neurons in the PF that categorically
represented ambiguous stimuli, but the categorical presence
emerged only after presentation of the stimulus and only with
a longer latency than with unambiguous stimuli. One possible
explanation for the absence of a neural bias in the PF in these
experiments (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Roy et al., 2014) is that
they required a perceptual choice rather than a goal choice
as in our task. In a recent study (Mochizuki and Funahashi,
2016), it was reported that the prestimulus activity of some
neurons in PF was predictive of the future choice of monkeys.
However, whether the neurons that exhibited the predictive
power were those involved in decision or motor processes was
not distinguished.
Conversely, using value-based free-choice decisions, a recent
neurophysiological study reported anticipatory activity of
neurons in the PFdl that was predictive of future choice (Maoz
et al., 2013), raising the possibility that value-based decisions, as
opposed to perceptual decisions, can be influenced by activity
bias in the PFdl. In Maoz et al. (2013), the task had two goals
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with different associated values, and the upcoming choice could
be predicted from the anticipatory activity when the two values
were alike, similar to the modulation that is observed in neurons
in the LIP, MST and SC during perceptual tasks (Basso and
Wurtz, 1998; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Williams et al., 2003).
In contrast to our study, they found that the neurons that are
involved in the decision process are not the same as those
that predicted the upcoming choice before presentation of the
stimulus. This result led the authors to hypothesize the separation
between a network of neurons with predeliberate spontaneous
activity that biases future choices under free-choice conditions
and a network of neurons that mediate rational decision-making.
Unlike in earlier studies, our task has the advantage of not
requiring any comparison between alternatives to determine
the correct goal location, as in the perceptual tasks, or any
evaluation and comparison of the values of the alternatives, as
in value-based decision tasks. Under these new conditions, we
found that neurons involved in goal coding from the decision
to the motor phase, in the PF showed prestimulus activity
that was highly predictive of future decisions. Importantly the
decision neurons’ activity could not depend on differences in
visual responses because all three targets were always presented.
Thus, our results indicate that neurons that exhibit a bias in the
prestimulus period are not necessarily dissociated from those
that are involved in decision formation, as proposed (Maoz
et al., 2013), and that a neural response bias can emerge,
even in the absence of a value-based decision in line with the
results of Mochizuki and Funahashi (2016). In our free-choice
condition, decision and motor neurons anticipated the choice
long before the stimulus was presented and held it until the
onset of movement. One explanation for these differences is that
the task in Maoz et al. (2013) required a comparison between
alternatives, whereas it was unnecessary to compare any feature
of the alternative goals in our task. In Maoz et al. (2013), the
comparison might have interfered with the prestimulus neural
response bias during the decision period, which did not occur in
our case.
In earlier studies (Genovesio et al., 2005, 2006; Tsujimoto
et al., 2008), we have shown that PF cells contribute to the
implementation of the strategy from stimulus identification to
the goal choice. Although these neural representations reflect
the strategy implementation, they could not account for the
goal selection in the free-choice condition, which remained
unexplained. Our study increases our understanding of the
function of the PF in the computations involved in the goal
choice. It shows that the activity of the decision and motor
neurons and, only to some extent, the activity of decision-only
neurons but not that of motor-only neurons is not limited to the
decision and motor processes but emerges before presentation of
the stimulus, biasing the upcoming choice.
In conclusion, the pre-existing activity of neurons in the PF
contributes to the decision process in free-choice conditions
but we cannot rule out the contribution of other areas as the
source of the bias. Further, our study has examined the prefrontal
contribution of the PFdl and PFdm to free choice at the single-cell
level, showing that under no external constraints or instructions,
the pre-existing state of the decision and motor PF neurons that
appear to bridge in time the decision and motor phases (Fuster,
1990) has a significant impact on the upcoming choice.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
AGperformed the experiment, EM analyzed the data andAG and
EM wrote the article.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Mr. Alex Cummings for the histological material,
Dr. Andrew Mitz for engineering, and Dr. Steve Wise for
his numerous contributions. This research was supported by
the Intramural Research Program of the National Institutes of
Health, National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH; Z01MH-
01092–28) and partially supported by the Italian FIRB 2010 grant
(RBFR10G5W9_001).
REFERENCES
Barraclough, D. J., Conroy, M. L., and Lee, D. (2004). Prefrontal cortex and
decision making in a mixed-strategy game. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 404–410. doi: 10.
1038/nn1209
Basso, M. A., and Wurtz, R. H. (1998). Modulation of neuronal activity
in superior colliculus by changes in target probability. J. Neurosci. 18,
7519–7534.
Brody, C. D., Hernández, A., Zainos, A., and Romo, R. (2003). Timing
and neural encoding of somatosensory parametric working memory in
macaque prefrontal cortex. Cereb. Cortex 13, 1196–1207. doi: 10.1093/cercor/
bhg100
Coe, B., Tomihara, K., Matsuzawa, M., and Hikosaka, O. (2002). Visual and
anticipatory bias in three cortical eye fields of the monkey during an adaptive
decision-making task. J. Neurosci. 22, 5081–5090.
Ding, L., and Hikosaka, O. (2006). Comparison of reward modulation in the
frontal eye field and caudate of themacaque. J. Neurosci. 26, 6695–6703. doi: 10.
1523/jneurosci.0836-06.2006
Falcone, R., Brunamonti, E., Ferraina, S., and Genovesio, A. (2015). Neural
encoding of self and another agent’s goal in the primate prefrontal cortex:
human-monkey interactions. Cereb. Cortex doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhv224 [Epub
ahead of print].
Foffani, G., andMoxon, K. A. (2004). PSTH-based classification of sensory stimuli
using ensembles of single neurons. J. Neurosci. Methods 135, 107–120. doi: 10.
1016/j.jneumeth.2003.12.011
Freedman, D. J., Riesenhuber, M., Poggio, T., and Miller, E. K. (2001). Categorical
representation of visual stimuli in the primate prefrontal cortex. Science 291,
312–316. doi: 10.1126/science.291.5502.312
Fuster, J. M. (1990). Prefrontal cortex and the bridging of temporal gaps in the
perception-action cycle. Ann. N Y Acad. Sci. 608, 318–329. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-
6632.1990.tb48901.x
Genovesio, A., Brasted, P. J., Mitz, A. R., and Wise, S. P. (2005). Prefrontal cortex
activity related to abstract response strategies. Neuron 47, 307–320. doi: 10.
1016/j.neuron.2005.06.006
Genovesio, A., Brasted, P. J., and Wise, S. P. (2006). Representation of future
and previous spatial goals by separate neural populations in prefrontal cortex.
J. Neurosci. 26, 7305–7316. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.0699-06.2006
Genovesio, A., Cirillo, R., Tsujimoto, S., Mohammad Abdellatif, S., andWise, S. P.
(2015). Automatic comparison of stimulus durations in the primate prefrontal
cortex: the neural basis of across-task interference. J. Neurophysiol. 114, 48–56.
doi: 10.1152/jn.00057.2015
Genovesio, A., and Ferraina, S. (2014). The influence of recent decisions on future
goal selection. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 369:20130477. doi: 10.
1098/rstb.2013.0477
Frontiers in Neural Circuits | www.frontiersin.org 8 September 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 75
Marcos and Genovesio Free-Choice in Prefrontal Cortex
Genovesio, A., Tsujimoto, S., Navarra, G., Falcone, R., and Wise, S. P. (2014a).
Autonomous encoding of irrelevant goals and outcomes by prefrontal
cortex neurons. J. Neurosci. 34, 1970–1978. doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.3228-
13.2014
Genovesio, A., Wise, S. P., and Passingham, R. E. (2014b). Prefrontal-parietal
function: from foraging to foresight. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 72–81. doi: 10.1016/j.
tics.2013.11.007
Genovesio, A., Tsujimoto, S., and Wise, S. P. (2008). Encoding problem-solving
strategies in prefrontal cortex: activity during strategic errors. Eur. J. Neurosci.
27, 984–990. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2008.06048.x
Genovesio, A., Tsujimoto, S., and Wise, S. P. (2009). Feature- and order-based
timing representations in the frontal cortex.Neuron 63, 254–266. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuron.2009.06.018
Genovesio, A., Tsujimoto, S., and Wise, S. P. (2011). Prefrontal cortex activity
during the discrimination of relative distance. J. Neurosci. 31, 3968–3980.
doi: 10.1523/jneurosci.5373-10.2011
Genovesio, A., Tsujimoto, S., and Wise, S. P. (2012). Encoding goals but not
abstract magnitude in the primate prefrontal cortex. Neuron 74, 656–662.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.02.023
Gold, J. I., and Shadlen, M. N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 30, 535–574. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.
113038
Haynes, J. D., Sakai, K., Rees, G., Gilbert, S., Frith, C., and Passingham, R. E. (2007).
Reading hidden intentions in the human brain. Curr. Biol. 17, 323–328. doi: 10.
1016/j.cub.2006.11.072
Herrnstein, R. J. (1961). Relative and absolute strength of response as a function of
frequency of reinforcement. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 4, 267–272. doi: 10.1901/jeab.
1961.4-267
Hoshi, E., Shima, K., and Tanji, J. (2000). Neuronal activity in the primate
prefrontal cortex in the process of motor selection based on two behavioral
rules. J. Neurophysiol. 83, 2355–2373.
Hussar, C. R., and Pasternak, T. (2013). Common rules guide comparisons of
speed and direction of motion in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. J. Neurosci.
33, 972–986. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4075-12.2013
Katsuki, F., Saito, M., and Constantinidis, C. (2014). Influence of monkey
dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal activity on behavioral choice
during attention tasks. Eur. J. Neurosci. 40, 2910–2921. doi: 10.1111/ejn.
12662
Kennerley, S. W., Dahmubed, A. F., Lara, A. H., and Wallis, J. D. (2009). Neurons
in the frontal lobe encode the value of multiple decision variables. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 21, 1162–1178. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21100
Kim, J. N., and Shadlen, M. N. (1999). Neural correlates of a decision in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of the macaque. Nat. Neurosci. 2, 176–185.
doi: 10.1038/5739
Laubach, M., Wessberg, J., and Nicolelis, M. A. (2000). Cortical ensemble activity
increasingly predicts behaviour outcomes during learning of a motor task.
Nature 405, 567–571. doi: 10.1038/35014604
Lauwereyns, J., Watanabe, K., Coe, B., and Hikosaka, O. (2002). A neural correlate
of response bias in monkey caudate nucleus. Nature 418, 413–417. doi: 10.
1038/nature00892
Lebedev, M. a., Messinger, A., Kralik, J. D., and Wise, S. P. (2004). Representation
of attended versus remembered locations in prefrontal cortex. PLoS Biol.
2:e365. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0020365
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., and Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious
intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential).
Brain 106, 623–642. doi: 10.1093/brain/106.3.623
Maoz, U., Rutishauser, U., Kim, S., Cai, X., Lee, D., and Koch, C. (2013).
Predeliberation activity in prefrontal cortex and striatum and the prediction
of subsequent value judgment. Front. Neurosci. 7:225. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2013.
00225
Marcos, E., Pani, P., Brunamonti, E., Deco, G., Ferraina, S., and Verschure, P.
(2013). Neural variability in premotor cortex is modulated by trial history and
predicts behavioral performance. Neuron 78, 249–255. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.
2013.02.006
Marcos, E., Tsujimoto, S., and Genovesio, A. (2016). Event- and time-dependent
decline of outcome information in the primate prefrontal cortex. Sci. Rep.
6:25622. doi: 10.1038/srep25622
Minamimoto, T., Hori, Y., Yamanaka, K., and Kimura, M. (2014). Neural signal
for counteracting pre-action bias in the centromedian thalamic nucleus. Front.
Syst. Neurosci. 8:3. doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2014.00003
Mochizuki, K., and Funahashi, S. (2016). Prefrontal spatial working memory
network predicts animal’s decision-making in a free choice saccade task. J.
Neurophysiol. 115, 127–142. doi: 10.1152/jn.00255.2015
Mushiake, H., Saito, N., Sakamoto, K., Itoyama, Y., and Tanji, J. (2006). Activity
in the lateral prefrontal cortex reflects multiple steps of future events in action
plans. Neuron 50, 631–641. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.045
Opris, I., Barborica, A., and Ferrera, V. P. (2005). Microstimulation of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex biases saccade target selection. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
17, 893–904. doi: 10.1162/0898929054021120
Padoa-Schioppa, C., and Assad, J. A. (2006). Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex
encode economic value. Nature 441, 223–226. doi: 10.1038/nature04676
Rolls, E. T., and Deco, G. (2011). Prediction of decisions from noise in the brain
before the evidence is provided. Front. Neurosci. 5:33. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2011.
00033
Rowe, J. B., Stephan, K. E., Friston, K., Frackowiak, R. S. J., and Passingham,
R. E. (2005). The prefrontal cortex shows context-specific changes in effective
connectivity to motor or visual cortex during the selection of action or colour.
Cereb. Cortex 15, 85–95. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhh111
Roy, J. E., Buschman, T. J., and Miller, E. K. (2014). Prefrontal cortex neurons
reflect categorical decisions about ambiguous stimuli. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 26,
1283–1291. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00568
Shadlen, M. N., and Newsome, W. T. (2001). Neural basis of a perceptual decision
in the parietal cortex (area LIP) of the rhesus monkey. J. Neurophysiol. 86,
1916–1936.
Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.-J., and Haynes, J.-D. (2008). Unconscious
determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nat. Neurosci. 11, 543–545.
doi: 10.1038/nn.2112
Stoianov, I., Genovesio, A., and Pezzulo, G. (2016). Prefrontal goal codes emerge
as latent states in probabilistic value learning. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 28, 140–157.
doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00886
Tanji, J., and Hoshi, E. (2001). Behavioral planning in the prefrontal cortex. Curr.
Opin. Neurobiol. 11, 164–170. doi: 10.1016/s0959-4388(00)00192-6
Thimm, M., Weidner, R., Fink, G. R., and Sturm, W. (2012). Neural mechanisms
underlying freedom to choose an object. Hum. Brain Mapp. 33, 2686–2693.
doi: 10.1002/hbm.21393
Thorndike, E. L. (1898). Animal intelligence: an experimental study of the
associative processes in animals. Psychol. Rev. 2, 1–107. doi: 10.1037/10780-000
Tsujimoto, S., Genovesio, A., and Wise, S. P. (2008). Transient neuronal
correlations underlying goal selection and maintenance in prefrontal cortex.
Cereb. Cortex 18, 2748–2761. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhn033
Williams, Z. M., Elfar, J. C., Eskandar, E. N., Toth, L. J., and Assad, J. A. (2003).
Parietal activity and the perceived direction of ambiguous apparent motion.
Nat. Neurosci. 6, 616–623. doi: 10.1038/nn1055
Yamagata, T., Nakayama, Y., Tanji, J., and Hoshi, E. (2012). Distinct information
representation and processing for goal-directed behavior in the dorsolateral
and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the dorsal premotor cortex. J. Neurosci.
32, 12934–12949. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2398-12.2012
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Marcos and Genovesio. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution and reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Neural Circuits | www.frontiersin.org 9 September 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 75
